Control of Mass Media in the USSR (Edexcel A Level History): Revision Note

Summary

• This note will examine the power of mass media in the Soviet state

• From Lenin to Chernenko, the Soviet state kept tight control over newspapers, radio, television, and cinema

• Media was used to spread propaganda, promote leaders’ cults of personality, and restrict access to alternative viewpoints

• Control meant that communist ideology was always presented as the official truth

  • However, many citizens became sceptical

    • They knew newspapers, radio, and television were heavily censored and did not reflect everyday reality

• Historians debate whether controlling the media strengthened Soviet stability or weakened it by alienating the public

Soviet control of newspapers & magazines

Lenin (1917–1924)

• Bolsheviks shut down opposition papers immediately after taking power

• Printing presses were nationalised

• Pravda ('Truth') became the Party’s main newspaper

  • It presenting Bolshevik ideology and attacking class enemies

Glavlit

• Stood for the Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs

• Created in 1922, it was the official state censorship body

• Every book, article, and film script had to be approved by the GPU before publication

• Controlled not just politics but also sensitive scientific topics (such as nuclear physics)

'Book Gulags'

• Banned or politically sensitive books were removed from general circulation

• Some were kept in special 'Book Gulags'

  • These were closed sections of libraries

• Access was tightly controlled, usually only granted to:

  • Academics with special permission

  • Party officials

Stalin (1928–1953)

• Newspapers like Pravda and Izvestiya reported successes of Five-Year Plans

  • The news credited Stalin will all of the achievements of the regime

  • Heroic workers were celebrated daily

• The media ignored famine, purges, or defeats

  • 'Bad news' was bad or blamed on saboteurs

• From 1928, Glavlit controlled access to all economic data

Khrushchev (1953–1964)

• In the 1950s–60s, a small degree of media pluralism emerged

  • The regime allowed more lifestyle and consumer-focused magazines

    • These were not politically critical but offered practical content, showing a shift towards meeting public demand

For women

• Magazines such as Rabotnitsa ('The Woman Worker') targeted female readers

• Offered advice on:

  • Childcare

  • Cooking

  • Health

  • Fashion

• Readers highlighted significant social issues in the USSR, such as:

  • Male alcoholism

  • Domestic inequalities

  • Domestic violence

• In response, Khrushchev launched a propaganda campaign against 'worthless men' who were not 'dedicated to communism'

  • This reflected Khrushchev’s promises to improve living standards and family life

Satire and humour

• Krokodil, a satirical magazine, mocked inefficiency, corruption, and minor social problems

• It was tightly censored and never criticised Party leaders

  • It acted as a 'safety valve' for public frustration

• Allowed readers to laugh at everyday absurdities while reinforcing loyalty to the state

Brezhnev to Chernenko (1964–1985)

• Leaders lost control of publications

  • Western magazines became increasingly common in Soviet cities

    • Popular magazines included Vogue

  • These showed the level of consumerism in the West, undermining the Soviet system

Soviet control of the radio

Lenin and Stalin

• Radios were mass-produced from the 1920s as a cheap way to spread propaganda

• Radios were deliberately made with limited tuning capacity, so they could only receive state stations

• Popular in rural areas where literacy was low

Khrushchev and Brezhnev

• Loudspeakers placed in public spaces, broadcasting news and Party speeches

• Foreign broadcasts like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America tried to reach Soviet audiences with alternative information

  • The USSR used jamming technology to block these signals, though some citizens found ways to listen secretly

• Despite censorship, radio remained an effective propaganda tool due to its speed and wide reach

Soviet control of the cinema

Lenin

• Lenin declared: “Of all the arts, cinema is the most important”

  • Films could reach illiterate peasants and spread ideology

• Early silent films showed revolutionary struggle

  • They vilified the Whites in the Civil War

• Newsreels were widely shown in towns and villages to spread Bolshevik victories

Stalin

• Cinema became a central part of Socialist Realism

• Films glorified industrialisation and collectivisation, portraying workers and peasants as heroes

• Stalin’s cult of personality dominated

  • Films like The Fall of Berlin (1950) celebrated Stalin's greatness during the Second World War

  • Leaders appeared as wise, fatherly figures guiding the USSR to greatness

Khrushchev

• De-Stalinisation and the Thaw brought more freedom in cultural life, including cinema

• Filmmakers explored ordinary people’s experiences, everyday struggles, and emotional lives, moving away from Stalinist hero-worship

• The Forty-First (1956)

  • A war film focusing on a female soldier and her doomed romance with a captured White officer

    • It highlighted personal stories, not just Party triumphs

• Ballad of a Soldier (1959)

  • Portrayed a young soldier’s humanity and sacrifice

    • It emphasised individual experience in war

Brezhnev

• The cultural thaw ended; censorship tightened again

• Cinema shifted back to safe and conservative genres, such as:

  • Historical epics

  • Patriotic war films

• However, Brezhnev also encouraged films that showcased consumer aspirations and luxury lifestyles

  • The Irony of Fate (1975) was a romantic comedy satirising Soviet housing blocks

    • However, it showed aspirational modern living

  • Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears (1980) followed three women in Moscow chasing careers, love, and consumer success

    • It portrayed Soviet modernity and the dream of a 'better life'

Soviet control of television

Early growth under Khrushchev (1950s–1960s)

• Television spread rapidly in the USSR

  • By the early 1960s, most towns had access to state-controlled channels

• Programming often celebrated scientific and technological triumphs, especially the space race

  • Coverage of Yuri Gagarin’s spaceflight (1961) made him a national and international hero

  • Gagarin’s smiling face was shown repeatedly, symbolising Soviet progress and superiority

Brezhnev (1964–1982)

Propaganda and news programming

• Television became the most popular medium for Soviet citizens, overtaking newspapers

• Estafeta Novostei (News Relay) was a central news programme

  • It provided highly controlled coverage of Soviet achievements and downplayed or ignored crises

• News reports consistently presented the USSR as stable, strong, and united, reinforcing Brezhnev’s “era of stability”

The War in Afghanistan (1979–1989)

• The invasion of Afghanistan was heavily censored on television

  • Official broadcasts described it as “internationalist duty” to support Afghan communists, avoiding mention of Soviet casualties

• Families often found out about deaths through unofficial networks, fuelling public cynicism about TV propaganda

Brezhnev’s declining health

• From the late 1970s, Brezhnev appeared regularly on television at Party congresses and official events

• His physical decline was obvious as he had:

  • Slurred speech

  • An inability to walk unaided

  • A reliance on notes

• Instead of reassuring the public, these broadcasts reinforced the sense of stagnation and decline in the USSR

Impacts of Soviet control of mass media

Strengthened control

• Promoted cults of personality for Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev

• Gave the Party a powerful propaganda tool, especially in highlighting Soviet victories

Created scepticism

• Citizens knew major problems (famines, corruption, shortages) were ignored

• Informal information networks and samizdat (self-published literature) grew as alternatives

• By the 1970s, trust in official media had declined sharply

Did controlling the media help or hinder the USSR?

• Historians disagree whether media control was a source of stability or a weakness that bred cynicism

Media control helped maintain stability

• Control over newspapers, radio, and TV allowed the Party to dominate public life

• Achievements (like space exploration) were turned into propaganda successes

Key historians

"The problem of understanding is all the greater because of the distance between the utopian vision and Soviet reality. It is tempting to dismiss the vision as simply deception and camouflage, especially since the utopian rhetoric actually did serve those purposes, among others, for the Soviet regime. But the vision cannot be dismissed in a study of everyday Stalinism. Not only was it a part of Stalinism, and an important one at that, but it was also a part of everyone’s everyday experience in the 1930s. A Soviet citizen might believe or disbelieve in a radiant future, but could not be ignorant that one was promised" - Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times (1999)

"By greatly increasing the numbers of people who could read, the Communist Party ensured that there was a wider audience for its written propaganda. A fundamental part of Stalinist propaganda was the virtual deification of Stalin... It had a number of purposes, including linking Stalin to the country's achievements and portraying him as Lenin's heir...Soviet propaganda presented a picture which had some grains of truth in it. And while remembering the horrors that Stalinism brought to many, it must also be acknowledged that some people benefited from the system." - Jonathan Davis, Stalin from the Grey Blur to Great Terror (2008)

Media control weakened the regime

• Heavy censorship widened the gap between propaganda and reality

• Citizens increasingly dismissed state media, undermining its effectiveness

Key historians

"Many people were disenchanted with the Soviet system. But few were brave enough to join the dissidents or oppose it openly. They might tell anti-Soviet jokes to let off steam in private. But they were unlikely to voice opposition views openly. This political conformity lies behind the stability of the Soviet system in its final years, when few people believed actively in the revolution's goals or propaganda claims. To explain it we must look at Soviet history and consider how the memory of repression formed what people called 'genetic fear'." - Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy (1996)

"In the only significant study of Soviet propaganda, Peter Kenez argues in a similar vein that the regime

succeeded in preventing the formation and articulation of alternate points of view. The Soviet people ultimately came not so much to believe the Bolsheviks' worldview as to take it for granted. Nobody remained to point out the contradictions and even innateness in the regime slogans.

These conclusions are undermined by the new sources, which reveal that, on the contrary, ordinary people were adept at defeating the censor, seeking out alternative sources of information and ideas in the form of rumours, personal letters, leaflets (listovki), and inscriptions (nadpisi). They also continued to draw on a variety of rival discourses, including those of nationalism, anti-Semitism, and populism, which proved tenacious despite concerted attempts to eradicate them." - Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941 (1998)