How Far did Gorbachev & Yeltsin Cause the Collapse of the USSR in 1991? (Edexcel A Level History): Revision Note

Summary

• This note will examine how far Gorbachev and Yeltsin were responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union

• Many historians argue that Gorbachev’s reforms fatally weakened the USSR

  • Perestroika created an economic crisis

  • Glasnost undermined Party authority

  • Political liberalisation exposed divisions that the system could not survive

• Yeltsin further accelerated the collapse by

  • Challenging Gorbachev’s authority

  • Promoting Russian sovereignty

  • His actions during the 1991 coup

  • Supporting the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

• In addition, external pressures intensified the crisis

  • The economic competition with the West

  • Falling oil prices

  • International support for independence

• Historians continue to debate whether the USSR fell because of

  • Gorbachev’s misjudgements

  • Yeltsin’s ambition

  • Wider global forces that reshaped world politics

Argument 1: Gorbachev was to blame for the collapse of the USSR

• Many historians argue that Gorbachev caused the collapse of the USSR because:

  • His reforms weakened the Communist Party

  • He created economic chaos

  • He destroyed central control

  • His misjudgements left the Soviet Union too divided and unstable to survive

Gorbachev's reforms

• Gorbachev wished to reform the Soviet Union through a series of economic and political reforms

• Perestroika was meant to revive the Soviet Union

  • Instead, it weakened the Soviet economy and political system

• Gorbachev's reforms resulted in the breakup of the Soviet Union as

  • The reform in 1985 was not necessary

    • There was no crisis or decline in the Party

    • Andropov had removed the dissident movement

  • They created a crisis, which resulted in the end of the Soviet Union

    • Such as glasnost, which exposed the failures and crimes of previous governments and lost the support of Soviet citizens

  • He was prepared to abandon essential features of Communism that kept the Soviet Union together

    • Such as centralised planning

Gorbachev's 'new thinking'

• Gorbachev introduced 'new thinking', a new political vocabulary designed to modernise Soviet politics

  • However, these new terms undermined the foundations of the Soviet system

• Gorbachev introduced the terms

  • Glasnost

    • Meaning openness

  • Perestroika

    • Meaning reconstruction initially and reform later

    • Used to disassociate Gorbachev from Khrushchev's failed policies

  • Demokratizatsiya

    • Meaning democratisation

  • Uskorenie

    • Meaning acceleration

  • Soviet pluralism

    • As pluralism was associated with a weakness of the West

    • Gorbachev added 'Soviet' to make it in line with Soviet values

• Gorbachev's decision for reform, such as the use of new vocabulary, encouraged

  • Others to advocate for radical alternatives to Communism

    • Such as freedom of speech

  • A public shift in attitudes

Westernisation in the Soviet Union

• Gorbachev had been an advocate for Western ideas in the Soviet Union, to make the Soviet Union more humane

  • He supported

    • The end of isolation

    • Human rights

    • The easing of travelling restrictions

    • Western radio transmissions

    • Pluralism

    • The end of violence as a method to retain the Eastern Bloc

• During the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress in July 1990, Gorbachev promised 'a civil society of free people'

  • This signalled a move toward democracy and Western values

Gorbachev's mistakes

• Gorbachev was responsible for the collapse of the USSR as he made several mistakes, including:

  • Perestroika

    • The reforms resulted in a crisis

  • Glasnost

    • The effects undermined the Communist Party

    • Gorbachev failed to see how fragile this made the Party and continued with this policy

  • Policy mistakes

    • Which undermined his position

    • They were often inconsistent and contradictory

  • Failure to win over the Communist Party

    • This resulted in a large amount of resistance to his reforms and the coup of 1991

• Overall, Gorbachev’s reforms are seen as a main reason for the collapse of the USSR due to

  • His economic failures

  • Political liberalisation

  • Poor handling of nationalism

    • This weakened the Communist Party and destroyed central control, leaving the Union too fragile to survive

Key historian

"The changes in what used to be the Soviet Union had been so great that it is easy to forget what the unreformed Soviet system was like and how modest were the expectations of significant innovation when Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as top Soviet leader in March 1985. Neither Soviet citizens nor foreign observers imagined that the USSR was about to be transformed out of existence. If the scale of change in the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev years is considered with dispassion, what is most remarkable is the extent to which it occurred peacefully. Given the failure of all who had openly attacked the system from within, and the country had to make any positive impact on policy outcomes prior to the late 1980s, it is doubtful if change of such magnitude could have taken place with so little violence, especially in Russia, in any way other than through the elevation of a serious reformer to the highest political office within the country. Without the promotion of a genuine reformer, a highly skilled politician to the top communist party post in 1985, fundamental change in the Soviet Union would certainly have been delayed and could well have been bloodier as well as slower than the relatively speedy political evolution which occurred while Gorbachev was at the helm.

There were many stimuli to the changes which followed the succession of Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership in March 1985 (some two or more years into Perestroika, the moral and intellectual legacy of the dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s) was of critical importance. The choice of Gorbachev, rather than any of the other people in the communist party leadership who could aspire to the party's (and at the time the country's) most powerful post, was of critical importance. " - Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, (1997)

Key historian

"Gorbachev's timid reforms did not bring about the desired results and made matters worse. The reforms brought greater shortages to the Soviet people, a decline in productivity and production, inflation, and a black market controlled by criminals. The signs of deterioration were ever more visible: liberal politicians and economists were telling Gorbachev that the way out of the crisis was to introduce more radical reforms. However, he knew that there was no constituency supporting such reforms and needed, and that the opponents of abandoning the foundations of the Soviet system were powerful, numerous, and well-organised.

Beginning in late 1989, his leadership became hesitant and erratic. He temporised at one time supporting the reformers but then a short time later withdrawing his support. He became increasingly isolated. The Gorbachev era was over at the end of 1990. From this point on, Gorbachev had no new news for reform; he was a spent force reorganising the political system, just as in matters of economics he temporised. The danger of spreading disorder – indeed, the possibility of civil war – brought him closer to conservatives, and he adjusted his policies accordingly. On one hand, he did not want to go further in reforming away from the Soviet system; on the other, he wanted to protect his reforms but did not know how to restore stability. " - Peter Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End, (2006)

Argument 2: Yeltsin was to blame for the collapse of the USSR

• Many historians argue that Yeltsin caused the collapse of the USSR because he

  • Challenged Gorbachev’s authority

  • Encouraged nationalism in Russia and the republics

  • Weakened the Communist Party

• His actions during and after the 1991 coup, and his decision to support the dissolution of the Union, made the survival of the USSR impossible

Yeltsin's rising popularity

• In 1990, Yeltsin became increasingly popular among Russian voters

  • He was popular, as during the Twenty-Seventh Party Conference, he called for

    • Equality

    • Multi-candidate elections for all posts in the Party

  • Between 1987 and 1988, Yeltsin attacked the leadership of the Party

    • Including those who opposed reform

• Russians believed Yeltsin was

  • An ordinary person

  • More aware of the country's problems

• In 1990, Yeltsin became more popular as he

  • Became the Chair of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies

    • Declaring Russian sovereignty

  • Established a Russian army

  • Resigned from the Communist Party in July 1990

    • Weakening the Party

• In June 1991, Yeltsin won the Russian Presidential election with 58% of the vote

Nationalism

• Yeltsin encouraged nationalism

  • He encouraged non-Russian republics to establish independence

    • In 1991, he supported the Baltic declarations of independence and publicly condemned Soviet troops in Lithuania

  • He emphasised the rights of Russia

    • As president, he was able to speak on behalf of the Russian people

• This weakened the Soviet Union and outmanoeuvred Gorbachev

The new elite

• Some historians argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union was due to the conflict between Communists in the Party

  • Rather than between Communists and democrats

• Yeltsin was a middle-ranking Communist official

  • Who supported their ideas and interests

    • He worked against the older, high-ranking Communist officials

  • Yeltsin also supported the lower-ranking Party officials

    • In 1987, Yeltsin sacked an established Party official and replaced him with a younger Party member

• As Yeltsin rose to power, which helped the new elite emerge

  • Gradually replacing the old Soviet elite

  • In Yeltsin's government, around 70% of his government were from the new elite

    • Only 13% belonged to Gorbachev's democratic reforms

• By supporting the new elite and middle-ranking Communist officials, Yeltsin contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union

  • As he supported the destruction of the Union to enhance the power of these individuals

Yeltsin and the 1991 coup

• In the 1991 coup, Yeltsin denounced the coup and declared it unconstitutional

  • He declared that Gorbachev be reinstated as President

• Yeltsin's resistance to the coup destroyed the authority of the Communist Party and the security services

• After the coup, Yeltsin

  • Banned the Communist Party in Russia

  • Seized Party property

    • Including its money

  • Published evidence of Party corruption from Party files

  • Announced that Russia was taking control of Soviet oil and gold reserves

• His actions effectively destroyed Communist control in Russia

  • As he attacked the Party which effectively held the Soviet Union together

Yeltsin and the CIS

• After the coup, Yeltsin moved slowly to rebuild the Union

  • He prioritised Russian sovereignty over preserving the USSR

• In autumn 1991, Yeltsin stopped supporting Gorbachev’s attempts to negotiate a new Union

• Instead, he backed the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

  • Yeltsin persuaded the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus to reject Gorbachev’s 'new Union' plan

    • Following this meeting, he encouraged the leaders of the Soviet military to abandon the Soviet Union and form the new Russian army

• Many historians believe that Yeltsin had the opportunity to save the Soviet Union, but he chose not to

  • As he blocked the last serious attempt to save the Union

Key historian

"Boris Yeltsin came to be the standard-bearer of reformists. He had been dropped from the top leadership of the party and had openly clashed with the conservative Yegor Ligachev. These facts have contributed to his growing popularity. In March 1991, his conservative opponents attempted to get rid of him as head of the elected Russian parliament. He outmanoeuvred them by creating the Office of the President of the Russian Republic and stood for election to the presidency of Russia in June 1991. For Yeltsin, the presidency of Russia became a power base. He established contracts with representatives of other republics and took a much more tolerant view of the nationalist aspirations of minorities. He openly deplored the bloodletting of the Vilnius in January 1991. Under Yeltsin's leadership, Russia began to act independently of the Soviet government, behaving as if Russia was really just one of the republics. This development, more than any other, led to the dissolution of the Union. " - Peter Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End, (2006)

Key historian

"In 1985, the Soviet Union appeared to be an entrenched entity, capable of defending itself against all challenges to the Communist Party's right to rule at home and in Eastern Europe, and determinedly pursued a policy of great-power competition abroad. By the end of 1991, an oppositional figure had been elected president of Russia. Both Communism and the Soviet Union had collapsed, and independent Russia had emerged as a seemingly helpless supplicant of the West.

Without presupposing that Gorbachev and Yeltsin made all these things happen, it is fair to say that things would have happened quite differently had different individuals been in charge. Their acts of leadership were crucial.

Khrushchev's reformism and Brezhnev's conservatism had long pedigrees within Soviet history, as did Gorbachev's initial strategy of reformism during 1985-1987, but Gorbachev's subsequent decision to push the transformation of the system and Yeltsin's decision to try to destroy and replace the Leninist system were unprecedented acts. By political leaders of the system itself, one cannot explain these choices without reference to leaders' personalities and beliefs. " - George W. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders, (2002)

Argument 3: Factors outside of the USSR caused its collapse

• Some historians argue that external pressures played a major role in causing the collapse of the USSR because

  • The Soviet economy could not compete with the West

  • The global political climate had changed

  • Events outside of the USSR weakened its power and legitimacy

The arms race

• During the late Cold War, the USSR struggled to match US military spending

  • The USA invested heavily in new technologies, such as the SDI “Star Wars” programme

• The USSR lacked the economic strength to compete and had to divert money away from consumer goods and social programmes

  • This increased shortages and economic decline inside the USSR

    • Preventing any reforms from being successful

Falling oil prices

• The USSR relied heavily on oil and gas exports to earn hard currency

• When global oil prices collapsed in the mid-1980s, drastically effective Soviet income

  • Limiting the government’s ability to fund imports and maintain living standards

• The economic decline made the system vulnerable, making reform urgent and the collapse of the Union increasingly likely

Western influence

• Western influence undermined the appeal of Soviet Communism

  • As Western broadcasting (e.g. Radio Liberty, Voice of America) reached Soviet citizens

  • People gained information about Western living standards, human rights and political freedoms

    • Increasing dissatisfaction with Soviet rule encouraged demands for change

  • Gorbachev’s policy of reducing Cold War tensions allowed more Western ideas to enter the USSR

• In comparison to Western ideas and advancements, Communism seemed outdated

  • Especially to younger Soviet citizens

International support for independence in the republics

• Western nations increasingly supported independence movements inside the USSR during 1990–91

  • This recognition gave nationalist groups legitimacy

    • It also encouraged confidence and made it harder for the USSR to re-establish control

• The USA had never formally recognised the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states (1940)

• By 1990–91, Western governments publicly supported:

  • Lithuania’s declaration of independence (March 1990)

  • Estonia and Latvia’s claims for sovereignty

• In 1991, after the January violence in Lithuania, European governments condemned Soviet actions

  • The USA warned Gorbachev that violence would jeopardise economic cooperation

• The failed coup in August 1991 dramatically accelerated Western support for the republics

  • Once the coup collapsed, Western governments quickly moved to formally recognise the Baltic states as independent

• After the Ukraine declared independence in August 1991, Western leaders signalled that they were prepared to recognise Ukraine

  • Once more than 90% of Ukrainians voted for independence in December 1991, the West supported their claim

    • With the West treating the Ukraine as independent, the USSR would struggle to continue to exist

• The international support for nationalist movements made it more difficult for the USSR to maintain control over its republics

Key historian

"At the same time that the administration was working to exploit the geopolitical cracks in the Soviet Bloc, it was effectively exacerbating the Soviet resource crisis. The American defence build-up is a case in point. The immediate purpose was to enhance deterrence, but the administration also had a much more fundamental objective. As spelled out in the Department of Defence Five-Year Planning Directive, the build-up was designed not only to raise the relative military strength of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union but also to contribute to the absolute decline in Soviet economic power. It was a form of economic warfare.

The build-up was not simply about larger budgets. How the funds were spent was equally important. The commitment to high-tech advanced weapons (including SDI) suddenly injected what for Moscow was a dangerous dynamic into the arms competition. The Kremlin favoured a largely quantitative race, because it assumed largely qualitative parameters. Moscow was at a drastic disadvantage and proved to be not up to the task. It was for this reason that Gorbachev possessed such an overarching fear of SDI and other American high-tech defence programs.

At the same time, the Regan administration worked to hit the Kremlin's pocketbook. The completion of the Siberian natural gas pipeline, half its planned size and two years behind schedule, was a big financial blow, along with a constant American campaign to drive down international energy prices. Tens of billions of dollars in critical hard currency were lost when they were most needed. Tighter restrictions on technology exports also hurt Soviet economic performance." - Paul Schweizer, Victory: The Regan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union, (1994)

Key historian

"In 1985, expenditures to develop the new wells to support yields on active wells combined with a lack of resources led to a fall in production of 12 million tonnes in the USSR. At the same time, the slow decrease in real cost of oil, which began in 1981-1984 after the decision of Saudi Arabia to more than triple production, met with the unprecedented collapse in prices. In 1985-1986, prices on resources that supported the Soviet budgets, its foreign trade balance, the stability of its consumer market, as well as its ability to buy tens of millions of tonnes of grain a year, to service its foreign debt and to finance the army-military-industrial complex fell several fold.

These problems did not cause the collapse of the socialist system that had been preordained by the fundamental characteristics of Soviet economy and political system. The instructions formed in late 1920s and early 1930s were too rigid and did not permit the country to adapt to the challenges of world development in the late 20th century. The legacy of socialist industrialisation, an ominous defence load, extreme crises in agriculture and non-competitive manufacturing sector made the fall of the regime inevitable. In the 1970s, there could have been managed if oil prices had been high, but that was not a dependable foundation for preserving their last empire." - Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia, (2007)