How Important was the Failure of Gorbachev's Political Reforms? (Edexcel A Level History): Revision Note
Exam code: 9HI0
Summary
This note will examine how important Gorbachev’s political reforms were to the collapse of the USSR
Some historians argue that the Soviet system was already politically unsustainable
Long-term issues made reform extremely risky, including:
Centralisation
Stagnation
Repression
Nationalism
Gorbachev’s reforms attempted to revitalise socialism through democratisation and glasnost
However, these weakened the Communist Party faster than new institutions could be built
Glasnost exposed
Corruption
Past abuses of power
National grievances towards Communism and the Party
Democratisation
Reduced Party authority
Encouraged opposition
Destabilised the political system
Historians debate whether the USSR was doomed by structural weaknesses or whether Gorbachev’s reforms triggered a crisis that made collapse unavoidable
Examiner Tips and Tricks
When evaluating interpretations, don’t treat political reform as an isolated issue.
High-level responses show how glasnost and democratisation had wider consequences, including weakening the authority of the Communist Party, giving space for organised opposition, and accelerating nationalist demands for independence.
By linking political reform to its broader impact on stability and the unity of the USSR, you demonstrate a stronger, more evaluative judgement of each historian’s argument.
Argument 1: The USSR was beyond saving politically
Some historians argue that the USSR was beyond saving politically because the one-party system created deep problems that made collapse likely, regardless of Gorbachev’s actions
The Soviet Union's political system had deep, long-term structural weaknesses
From Lenin onwards, the USSR was built as a one-party centralised state
Power was concentrated in the Communist Party, especially the politburo
As there were no legal opposition parties, no political competition and no way for the system to correct mistakes
Centralisation caused inflexibility and slow decision-making
Major decisions were made by a small group of elderly leaders in Moscow
Local officials had very little independence, so problems were often hidden rather than resolved
The system discouraged innovation or criticism
Resulting in stagnation by the 1970s and 1980s
The system relied on repression to maintain control by
The secret police
Censorship
Reduction of personal freedoms
As Soviet citizens became more educated and aware of life in the West, cynicism and faith in Communism declined
By the 1980s, the state could only survive through fear rather than genuine support
There was no mechanism for political renewal
Leadership succession relied on internal party battles rather than elections
As a result, the country became dominated by gerontocracy under Brezhnev
There was no way to refresh the political system, making reform extremely risky
The Party's control over the economy created long-term problems
Central planning and political interference made the economy inefficient and unresponsive to the crisis
As the Party controlled industry, agriculture, and investment, economic decline became a political problem that the system could not admit or address
By the 1980s, the political structure was so tied to the planned economy that reforming one meant destabilising the other
Nationalism showed how fragile the political union was
The USSR contained over 100 nationalities with their own cultures and histories
Moscow relied on tight political control to keep people loyal
Once political control weakened even slightly, independence movements surged
Showing that the union had never been politically secure
Past attempts to reform the USSR showed how dangerous it was to attempt reform
Khrushchev’s reforms (1950s–60s) revealed how easily the system became unstable when challenged
His removal in 1964 showed that the Party was unwilling to tolerate major political change
This created a situation where meaningful reform was seen as a threat
Leaving the USSR effectively locked into a failing model
By the 1980s, the political system lacked legitimacy
Corruption was widespread
Many officials held posts for life regardless of performance
Citizens were aware of the gap between Communist ideals and Soviet reality
Without popular legitimacy and without democratic renewal, the USSR rested on a fragile political foundation
Overall, these weaknesses meant the Soviet political system could not adapt or renew itself, making collapse likely even without Gorbachev
Key historian
"Many historians adopt the long-term view that the Soviet system, while successful in transforming the former Russian Empire into a powerful industrial state, contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Systemic weaknesses, a redundant ideology, internal contradictions, and the absence of the flexibility required to adapt to changing environments and challenges meant that, even if its collapse need not have occurred exactly when it did, it was ultimately inevitable." - Jeremy Smith, The Fall of Soviet Communism, (2005)
Key historian
"While there had been an accumulation of problems over several decades, including a secular decline in the rate of economic growth and rising rates of infant mortality and alcoholism, and through the gulf between Soviet rhetoric and reality had led to an increase in populist cynicism, there was no strong pressure from below for change in 1985. The dissident movement had been crushed and the atmosphere was primarily one of political apathy and fatalism. In Brezhnev's time there had been a lot of talk about the 'scientific and technological revolution', but, technologically the Soviet Union was lagging far behind the advanced Western countries and not faring well in comparison with the newly industrialising countries of Asia. Moreover, the war in Afghanistan was proving costly and becoming increasingly unpopular. Yet all the mechanisms of political control were firmly in place and it is highly likely that the system - and according to the Soviet state - could have survived the twenty-first century had not radical reform or, 'revolution from above', shaken its foundations. Although Gorbachev, with some justification, spoke of the presence of 'pre-crisis phenomena' in the Soviet Union he inherited, it was not so much a case of crisis forcing radical reform as of radical reform generating crisis." - Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Era, (2006)
Examiner Tips and Tricks
In the interpretation question, examiners expect a balanced evaluation.
Strong answers compare not only what each historian argues, but also what their interpretation leaves out.
For example, a historian who focuses on long-term political weaknesses may overlook the speed and scale of the crisis after 1986, while one who blames Gorbachev may underestimate the fragility of the one-party state he inherited.
Highlighting these gaps shows sophisticated judgment and helps you reach the top levels.
Argument 2: Gorbachev failed to reform the Communist Party & the Soviet Government
Some historians argue that Gorbachev's political reform failed because it weakened the Communist Party without replacing it with anything stable
Resulting in
A loss of authority
Rising opposition
A collapse in state control
Gorbachev's political objectives
Gorbachev wanted to revitalise the USSR by
Ending Brezhnev-era stagnation and corruption
Returning to a 'Leninist model' of genuine participation in soviets
However, he never developed a clear plan for how this would work
His goals were contradictory, as he wanted to
Revive socialism
By returning to true Leninist principles and strengthening participation
Increase openness
Through glasnost
He hoped it would expose corruption, economic failures and past abuses
However, it resulted in widespread criticism of the Communist Party
Preserve one-party rule
By banning political opposition
However, democracy inside the party reduced its power, making one-party rule hard to maintain
The lack of a strategy meant reforms were reactive and not coordinated
Ultimately, weakening Party control
Gorbachev's early political reforms
Gorbachev replaced elderly Brezhnev-era officials with younger reformers
Hoping this would modernise the government
This created factionalism rather than unity
Gorbachev focused on economic reform in his first year (1985-86)
However, his economic policies failed
Leading Gorbachev to believe that political reform was essential to revive the economy
Gorbachev argued that the economy was too centralised to be effective
He also stated that official data had been manipulated to hide failures, making it impossible to plan accurately
To resolve the issues, Gorbachev planned to
Start democratisation
To limit the power of traditionalists
Speed up economic reform
Reduce the control of the Communist Party over government decisions
Have a policy of openness
To end the manipulation of data
To help economic recovery
Allow criticism of officials and expose corruption
Glasnost and the collapse of Party control
Gorbachev introduced glasnost in 1986, to
Encourage openness
Expose corruption
Discuss economic failures
Allow the Party to correct mistakes
Gorbachev believed openness would help the Party fix its problems, not destroy it
Under glasnost, the media were given greater freedom
Journalists began reporting on social problems, shortages and environmental disasters
This eventually included Chernobyl despite its initial reluctance, displaying continued secrecy and corruption within the Party. Resulting in the loss of faith in the Party
Newspapers and television criticised officials for incompetence and dishonesty
Ending the Party’s monopoly over information
However, glasnost expanded beyond Gorbachev's original intentions
By 1987-88, criticism spread from policy to the Party to the entire Soviet Union
Senior officials were attacked publicly
Intellectuals and reformers began questioning Marxism–Leninism itself
Nationalist movements used glasnost to publicise demands for independence
Glasnost weakened the Party instead of reforming it as
Public trust declined as hidden problems were revealed
Party divisions deepened
The USSR’s weaknesses were exposed to the whole population
Citizens became more willing to challenge the central authority
Glasnost led to greater pressure for political reform than Gorbachev intended
The Twenty-Seventh Party Congress and change
The Twenty-Seventh Party Congress was held in February and March 1986
It was held to set a new direction for the Communist Party
Although Gorbachev stated that he was committed to 'genuine democracy' and improvement of socialism, there was little evidence of it at the Party Congress
Gorbachev offered no
Detailed proposals
Signs of progress
Delegates supported the idea of reform
However, they blocked actual implementation, revealing deep internal resistance
The Party Congress signalled ambition but produced no structural change
Weakening confidence in Gorbachev’s leadership
The liberalisation of Soviet media
Gorbachev allowed the media to have greater freedom of expression
Aleksandr Yakovlev became responsible for the Soviet media
Appointing new editors to Communist newspapers
Hoping this would encourage intellectuals to critique the Party and produce new ideas
Journalists were allowed to publish criticisms of:
Stalin’s terror
Corruption in the Party
Economic failures
Living standards
Environmental disasters
Banned books were now allowed to be published
Along with films
Including the film Repentance, which criticised Stalin's terror
Once controls were relaxed, the press exposed far more problems than Gorbachev expected
Intellectuals and reformers became openly hostile to the Party
The media amplified discontent, accelerating the political crisis
Overall, Gorbachev’s reforms failed because they weakened the Communist Party faster than they rebuilt the government, leaving the USSR without authority or political stability by the late 1980s
Key historian
“In 1990, Gorbachev loosened the electoral structure one stage further. He amended Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution to end the Communist Party’s monopoly and legalised the formation of alternative political parties. At the time, elections to the Supreme Soviets of the union republics were imminent and these elections transformed the political scene yet again. For one thing, they fatally weakened the Communist Party’s executive monopoly, for since 1917 it had been the effective focus of Soviet authority; coordinating whatever undertaking was underway in both state and economic life depended on its function, leaving a great vacuum at the centre of politics. Gorbachev attempted to fill it by creating the post of President of the USSR and having himself elected to it by the Congress of People's Deputies. But the new presidency had no real executive chain of command of its own. In any case, Gorbachev, never having been confirmed by popular election, lacked the legitimacy of, say, a US President. This lack of either symbolic or actual authority undermined him fatally over the next 18 months as economic crisis and inter-ethic conflict engulfed his reform programme. ” - Geoffrey Hosking, Russia and the Russians: From Earliest Times to the Present, (2012)
Key historian
"The term ‘reform’ implies a series of modifications which leave the basic political, economic and social order intact. However, some of the principal features of communism in the USSR were being undermined by Gorbachev’s reforming activity: the one-party state, the ideological control, the centralised administration and the state economic monopoly. Perestroika had become a project for total transformation. It was hardly surprising that many senior Soviet figures, including some he had promoted, were shocked by what was happening. Gorbachev, by his actions, if not by his deliberate purpose, was engineering the disintegration of the existing Soviet system.
Gorbachev's communist background prevented him from seeing clearly where his path of transformation was leading the USSR. While he wanted a market economy, he did not think this would involve much capitalism. While wishing to replace traditional communist officials with energetic newcomers, he often chose newcomers who had no serious commitment to reform. Although he did radicalise his proposals during these years, Gorbachev always lagged behind the deepening crisis affecting the economy, the republics and the personnel of the Soviet system." - Robert Service, A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin, (2003)
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