Foreign Policy: USA, Europe & Empire, 1964-1970 (AQA A Level History: Component 2: Depth study): Revision Note

Relations with the USA and the issue of Vietnam

Wilson and the Atlantic Alliance

• Wilson was personally pro-American. He strongly supported NATO (the Atlantic Alliance) and Britain's "special relationship" with the United States

  • The Cold War continued, and Britain wanted the United States to remain committed to the defence of Europe

  • Wilson made his first visit to the United States as prime minister in December 1964

• The relationship mattered more to Britain than it did to the United States

  • Britain relied on American financial support to protect the value of sterling

    • This limited how far Wilson could challenge American foreign policy

Approach: Wilson gave this speech during an official visit to the United States in December 1964. As prime minister speaking to an American audience, he wanted to present Britain and the United States as close allies

His language about friendship and common aims is useful for showing the importance he placed on the relationship. However, the speech was delivered at the start of his premiership and before later disagreements over Vietnam became more serious. Therefore, compare it with what Wilson later did

Why did Johnson want British troops?

• The United States expanded its involvement in Vietnam from 1964

  • President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted support from American allies to give the war greater international backing

  • Australia sent troops

    • Johnson pressed Britain to do the same

• Wilson refused to send British forces

  • He offered diplomatic and moral support instead

    • This position remained unchanged throughout his government

The pressures pulling Wilson in both directions

• Sending troops would have caused serious political problems

  • The war was deeply unpopular in Britain, especially on the Labour left

    • Wilson already needed to hold together a divided Labour Party

  • In June 1966, Michael Foot attacked the government in the Tribune for sharing "the guilt for the continuance of the infamy of Vietnam"

• Britain could not easily afford another military commitment

  • The government was already reducing defence spending

• Wilson could not completely break with Washington

  • Britain needed American help to support sterling and avoid devaluation

    • Openly condemning the United States could have put that support at risk

The outcome of Wilson's policy

• Wilson's eventual position was moral support without military support

  • Britain backed the United States diplomatically

  • British troops were not sent to Vietnam

  • In June 1966, Wilson publicly dissociated Britain from the American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong

  • Wilson also tried to broker peace, including talks with Soviet leader Alexei Kosygin in London in February 1967

• The approach satisfied neither side

  • The United States wanted stronger British support

  • Labour MPs and anti-war campaigners wanted Wilson to condemn the war

Britain's response to world affairs

The Cold War background

• The Cold War continued to shape how ministers viewed Britain's international role

• Alexander Dubček became leader of Czechoslovakia in January 1968

  • He introduced reforms that increased freedom of speech and movement

  • He also attempted to decentralise parts of the economy

• In August 1968, Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia and ended the reforms

  • The invasion strengthened the view that the Soviet Union still posed a threat to Western Europe

  • Britain condemned the invasion but, like the rest of NATO, took no military action

• The Arab–Israeli Six-Day War of June 1967 closed the Suez Canal

  • This raised the cost of British trade and added to the pressure on sterling before the 1967 devaluation

Keeping the nuclear deterrent

• Wilson's government decided to keep Britain's independent nuclear deterrent

  • There was no serious attempt to abandon it, despite its cost

  • Britain continued to use American-supplied Polaris missiles

  • The government agreed to upgrade the system in 1967

• This decision disappointed some Labour supporters

  • Labour had received support from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)

  • Wilson presented the deterrent as part of Britain's contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), rather than as a separate national policy

Wilson's view of Britain's world role

• Wilson argued that Britain should act through collective security

  • He rejected independent military action of the kind attempted during the Suez Crisis of 1956

  • He placed Britain's security within Europe and the Atlantic Alliance

• He also accepted that Britain could no longer act as a "global policeman"

  • Britain would reduce some overseas commitments

  • It would continue to play a role through NATO, Europe and cooperation with its allies

Approach: Wilson gave his speech at the Labour Party Conference in Blackpool in 1968. He was speaking to Labour members while the defence cuts and the withdrawal from East of Suez were under debate

This source is useful for showing how Wilson explained Britain's reduced global role. He presented the changes as a move towards collective security rather than a complete withdrawal from world affairs. However, as party leader, he also had a reason to defend policies that had been shaped by economic pressure

Relations with Europe

Why Labour initially opposed EEC membership

• The Labour government, elected in 1964, was not committed to joining the EEC

  • In 1962, Hugh Gaitskell opposed the terms of Britain's first application, made in 1961

    • He warned that membership could lead towards a federal European political union

• Much of the Labour Party remained opposed

  • Michael Foot, Barbara Castle and others on the Labour left viewed the EEC as a capitalist organisation

  • They feared that membership would restrict a future Labour government's ability to introduce socialist policies

  • The trade unions largely shared this view

• A smaller group supported entry

  • Roy Jenkins and George Brown were among the leading pro-European ministers

Why did Wilson change his position?

• Wilson remained uncertain about joining the EEC

  • He preferred close links with the United States and the Commonwealth

  • However, he increasingly accepted the economic arguments: the EEC economies were growing faster than Britain's, and British trade was shifting from the Commonwealth to Europe

• By 1966, support for a new application had grown inside the Cabinet

  • In October 1966, ministers agreed to explore a new application

• Wilson tried to avoid further divisions within Labour

  • The chances of success appeared limited, so opponents on the Labour left did not campaign strongly against the application

The second application and de Gaulle's veto

• Wilson and George Brown met French President Charles de Gaulle in Paris in January 1967

  • They believed the meeting had gone reasonably well

  • They then visited the other five EEC member states to gather support

• Britain formally applied to join the EEC in May 1967, after the House of Commons approved the application by a large majority

• A second meeting with de Gaulle in June 1967 was less successful

  • De Gaulle wanted Britain to weaken its close relationship with the United States

    • Wilson was unwilling to do this

• In November 1967, de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application

  • Britain had now been rejected for the second time in six years

  • Britain did not join the EEC until after de Gaulle had left office

Decolonisation: 'withdrawal East of Suez' and Rhodesia

• Labour inherited a process of decolonisation that had already begun under the Conservatives

• The government faced two main issues:

  • reducing overseas military commitments

  • dealing with Rhodesia's attempt to gain independence under white minority rule

Continuing decolonisation

• Labour continued the decolonisation policy, which began under the Conservatives

  • By 1964, the "Wind of Change" had brought independence to 18 new Commonwealth states

  • Northern Rhodesia became Zambia in 1964

  • Nyasaland became Malawi in 1964

• The government wanted to reduce the cost of Britain's remaining overseas commitments

  • Many politicians and members of the public still believed that Britain should maintain an important world role

    • This made cuts to Britain's overseas presence politically difficult

Withdrawal from East of Suez

• Ministers accepted from 1964 that Britain's overseas military commitments would have to be reduced

  • Defence Secretary Denis Healey introduced spending cuts intended to reduce the defence budget to below £2 billion by 1970

  • The 1967 Defence White Paper set out plans to withdraw troops from Aden, the Middle East, Malaysia, and Singapore

  • The TSR-2 strike aircraft had already been cancelled in 1965 because of its cost

• The devaluation crisis of 1967 led to faster withdrawal

  • Chancellor Roy Jenkins introduced further spending cuts in January 1968

  • Troops were now to leave the Persian Gulf, Malaysia and Singapore by the end of 1971

    • Britain had already withdrawn from Aden in November 1967

  • The order for American F-111 aircraft, bought to replace the TSR-2 (cancelled in 1965), was abandoned because of its cost

    • Defence Secretary Denis Healey strongly opposed this cut

• The withdrawal ended Britain's permanent military presence across a chain of bases from the Arabian Gulf to Singapore

Rhodesia and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence

• Southern Rhodesia remained under white minority rule

  • The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland broke up in 1963

  • Britain insisted that Southern Rhodesia must guarantee progress towards majority rule before gaining independence

• Prime Minister Ian Smith of Southern Rhodesia rejected these terms

  • His government issued a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965

  • Political power remained in the hands of the white minority

  • The UDI challenged the authority of the British government

Approach: Wilson was speaking to party members while defending the government's policy on Rhodesia

His repeated use of words such as "principles", "democracy", and "moral inspiration" shows that he presented opposition to white minority rule as a moral issue, not simply as a political dispute. He also linked the policy to Britain's reputation and the unity of the Commonwealth.

However, Wilson had a reason to stress "principle" because sanctions and negotiations had not yet forced Smith to give way. The source is therefore strongest for showing how Wilson justified his policy rather than proving it had been successful

Why sanctions and negotiations failed

• Wilson expected the dispute to be settled quickly

  • He hoped that oil sanctions or negotiations would produce an agreement

• Economic sanctions failed

  • Rhodesia received supplies through the Portuguese colony of Mozambique

  • Major oil companies often ignored the sanctions

  • South Africa continued to trade with Rhodesia

• Two rounds of talks also failed

  • Wilson met Smith aboard HMS Tiger in December 1966

    • Smith later rejected the terms discussed

    • Wilson then adopted the policy of 'No Independence Before Majority African Rule' (NIBMAR)

  • Further talks aboard HMS Fearless in October 1968 also broke down

    • Smith believed he could rely on support from the Conservative right

    • He expected Britain to compromise

• The dispute continued

  • Commonwealth governments criticised Britain's failure to end white minority rule

  • The Labour left also criticised Wilson

  • Britain could not enforce its authority in Rhodesia

How far did Britain's world role decline, 1964-1970?

• Britain's world role changed significantly between 1964 and 1970

  • Some developments showed a clear loss of power and influence

  • Others showed that Britain was concentrating on fewer commitments rather than withdrawing from world affairs entirely

    • Some evidence for each side is outlined below

Evidence of decline

• Withdrawal from East of Suez ended Britain's permanent military presence across the Middle East and Asia

  • Economic weakness played a major part in the decision

  • Britain could no longer afford its existing commitments

• Two failed applications to join the EEC in six years showed that Britain could not determine its own position in Europe

• Wilson could not take an independent line over Vietnam

  • Britain depended on American support for sterling

• Britain failed to force Ian Smith's government in Rhodesia to accept majority rule

  • Economic sanctions were weakened by continued trade through Mozambique and South Africa

  • Major oil companies also ignored the sanctions

• The Commonwealth became a weaker source of British influence

  • The failure in Rhodesia and limits on Commonwealth immigration alienated many member states

• Defence cuts included the cancellation of the TSR-2 (1965) and the F-111 order (1968)

Evidence of a reshaped role

• Britain retained its independent nuclear deterrent

  • The government agreed to upgrade Polaris

  • In 1967 decided not to buy Poseidon

• Britain remained an important member of NATO and continued to support the Atlantic Alliance

• Wilson kept British troops out of the Vietnam War

  • This avoided involvement in a long, expensive and unpopular conflict

• Withdrawal from East of Suez was planned to take place by the end of 1971

  • This can be seen as a gradual reduction in commitments rather than an immediate retreat

• Wilson argued that Britain's position on Rhodesia had helped to maintain Commonwealth unity

• Applying to the EEC showed that Britain was seeking greater influence in Europe