Foreign Affairs, 1987-1997 (AQA A Level History: Component 2: Depth study): Revision Note

Exam code: 7042

Lottie Bates

Written by: Lottie Bates

Reviewed by: Bridgette Barrett

Updated on

Summary

  • The Single European Act (1986) committed the European Community to completing a single market by 1993

    • Thatcher later used her Bruges Speech of September 1988 to reject a more federal Europe

  • The Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 1992, created the European Union

    • Britain secured opt-outs from the single currency and the Social Chapter

  • Britain favoured a wider rather than deeper Union

    • It backed enlargement from 12 to 15 members in 1995

    • At the same time, Conservative resistance to further political integration increased

  • Britain remained involved in international intervention

    • British troops served in Bosnia as UN peacekeepers from 1992

    • Britain later joined NATO airstrikes in 1995, before the Dayton Agreement ended the war

  • Britain continued to work closely with the United States as the Cold War ended

    • It also sent around 45,000 troops to the coalition that liberated Kuwait in 1991

  • The key question asks whether Britain's world role shifted decisively between 1987 and 1997, or whether its main international commitments broadly remained the same

The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty

The impact of the Single European Act

  • The Single European Act (SEA) came into force on 1 July 1987

    • It committed the European Community to completing a single market by 1 January 1993

    • Goods, services, capital and people would be able to move between member states without internal barriers

  • British governments strongly supported the economic aims of the single market

    • Greater access to European markets suited Britain's increasingly open and service-based economy

    • Thatcher, therefore, supported European cooperation where she believed it strengthened free trade

  • However, the SEA also increased pressure for deeper European integration

    • It extended qualified majority voting to most single-market laws, so Britain could now be outvoted in areas where it had previously held a veto

    • The Delors Report of 1989 argued that the single market would work more effectively alongside a single currency

      • This helped move the debate beyond economic cooperation towards economic and monetary union

    • Britain joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in October 1990 but was forced out on Black Wednesday, the 16th September 1992, which strengthened Conservative Euroscepticism

Thatcher's alternative vision, Bruges, 1988

  • Thatcher opposed the idea that economic cooperation should lead to a more centralised Europe

    • In her Bruges Speech on 20 September 1988, she argued that Europe should remain a partnership of sovereign states

    • She rejected the idea of decisions becoming increasingly centralised in Brussels

  • Her position differed from that of Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission

    • Delors supported closer political and economic integration

    • Thatcher accepted cooperation between European states but opposed the development of a federal Europe

  • The speech, therefore, exposed an important distinction in Thatcher's European policy

    • She supported the single market

      • But she resisted the political integration that she believed might follow from it

"I want to see us work more closely on the things we can do better together than alone. Europe is stronger when we do so, whether it be in trade, in defence, or in our relations with the rest of the world. But working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy"

Margaret Thatcher, speech to the College of Europe, Bruges, 20 September 1988

Approach: Thatcher delivered the Bruges speech in September 1988 to a European audience, setting out her preferred direction for the Community.

The source is useful because it shows that Thatcher was not rejecting European cooperation altogether. She supports countries working together, but objects to greater centralisation and bureaucracy.

As a public political speech, it was intended to persuade. It is therefore strongest as evidence of the position Thatcher wanted to defend publicly, rather than proof of how the Community itself was developing.

The Maastricht Treaty, 1992

  • John Major negotiated the Treaty on European Union at Maastricht in December 1991, with Britain signing it on the 7 February 1992

    • The treaty created the European Union, with the European Community as one of its three 'pillars'

    • It extended cooperation beyond the single market into areas including foreign policy, security and justice

    • It also set out a route towards economic and monetary union, including a future single currency

  • Major secured important protections for Britain

    • Britain gained an opt-out from the single currency

      • It was not required to enter the final stage of monetary union

    • Britain also opted out of the Social Chapter

      • Major argued that its employment protections could increase costs for British businesses

  • Britain also influenced the wording and structure of the treaty

    • The principle of subsidiarity was included

    • The word "federal" was removed from the final treaty text

    • Foreign policy and home affairs remained largely under cooperation between national governments rather than direct control by the European Commission

  • Maastricht therefore represented both greater integration and British resistance to parts of that integration

    • Major accepted a stronger European Union

    • At the same time, the opt-outs limited Britain's commitment to some of its most important developments

    • At home, ratification split the Conservative Party, and Major only secured it in July 1993 by turning a Commons vote into a vote of confidence

“RESOLVED to mark a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities, ... RESOLVED to achieve the strengthening and the convergence of their economies and to establish an economic and monetary union including, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, a single and stable currency, ... RESOLVED to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world, ... IN VIEW of further steps to be taken in order to advance European integration HAVE DECIDED to establish a European Union.”

Adapted from the text of the Maastricht Treaty, 1992

Approach: The extract comes from the preamble to the Maastricht Treaty, agreed by all 12 member states in 1992

It is useful because it records the aims governments publicly agreed to, including closer economic, monetary and political cooperation

However, a treaty preamble shows stated intentions rather than outcomes. It cannot show how successfully these aims were implemented or how strongly individual governments supported every part of the agreement

Examiner Tips and Tricks

Keep the two treaties distinct. The Single European Act focused mainly on completing the single market, while Maastricht extended integration into monetary and political cooperation

Date the Bruges Speech correctly to September 1988, after the SEA. Examiners report students placing it in 1987 or earlier, and labelling Thatcher as simply pro- or anti-European. Show that she backed the single market but opposed a federal Europe

Britain's role in the European Union

Supporting a larger European Union

  • Both Thatcher and Major favoured a wider European Union rather than a more politically integrated one

    • Britain strongly supported enlargement from 12 to 15 members in January 1995, when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined

    • Britain also supported eventual membership for the former communist states of Eastern Europe

  • A larger and more diverse Union was less likely to develop into a tightly integrated federal system

  • Enlargement therefore suited both Britain's trading interests and its preference for cooperation between sovereign states

  • Britain also supported the principle of subsidiarity

    • Decisions should be taken at the lowest effective level rather than automatically being made in Brussels

      • This fitted Major's aim of limiting further centralisation

Resisting further integration

  • Britain opposed changes that appeared to strengthen European institutions at the expense of national governments

    • In 1994, Major blocked the appointment of Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene as President of the European Commission, as he was regarded as too federalist

    • At the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Britain resisted extending qualified majority voting into further areas

  • This did not mean Britain wanted to leave the EU

    • Britain remained a full member throughout the period

    • British governments continued to support the single market and free trade within Europe

The limits of the Maastricht opt-outs

  • The Maastricht opt-outs allowed Britain to remain involved while avoiding particular commitments

    • Britain was not required to join the planned single currency

    • It also stayed outside the Social Chapter

  • However, the opt-outs did not satisfy everyone

    • Other member states increasingly viewed Britain as a member that wanted to avoid some shared commitments

    • British Eurosceptics were also dissatisfied because many objected to the wider direction of European integration, not just individual treaty measures

The beef ban and non-cooperation, 1996

  • Britain's relationship with the EU became particularly strained during the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis

    • The disease was often referred to in the media as "mad cow disease"

    • In March 1996, the British government announced a probable link between BSE in cattle and a new form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans

    • The European Commission imposed a worldwide ban on exports of British beef on 27 March 1996

  • Major responded with a policy of non-cooperation

    • From 21 May 1996, Britain blocked EU decisions that required unanimity until progress was made on lifting the beef ban

    • This did not mean Britain withdrew from the Union

      • It was a tactic intended to put pressure on other member states

  • The dispute was partly eased at the Florence European Council in June 1996

    • EU governments agreed on a framework for lifting the ban in stages

    • However, the wider beef ban was still in place when the Conservatives left office in 1997

“I have to tell the House that, without progress towards lifting the ban, we cannot be expected to continue to co-operate normally on other Community business. I say this with great reluctance, but the European Union operates through good will. If we do not benefit from good will from partners, clearly we cannot reciprocate. ... That is not how I wish to do business in Europe, but I see no alternative. We cannot continue business as usual within Europe when we are faced with the clear disregard by some of our partners of reason, of common sense and of Britain’s national interests.”

John Major, statement to the House of Commons on the EU beef ban, 21 May 1996

Approach: Major made this statement in the House of Commons on 21 May 1996, when announcing the policy of non-cooperation.

The source is useful because it shows how the government justified its approach, presenting the beef ban as unfair to British interests and arguing that normal EU cooperation could not continue without progress.

However, Major was defending a controversial policy to Parliament and his own Conservative backbenchers, so his language should be compared with what the policy actually achieved.

“Does the Prime Minister find any irony in the fact that the Government’s hopes now rest in the operation of the majority voting system, something that they are determined to get rid of, or diminish, in the forthcoming IGC? ... Having listened to the Prime Minister’s statement today, most people will conclude that the Euro-sceptic minority on his Back Benches has taken control of the Government’s foreign policy, and that this has much more to do with appeasing them than restoring confidence in the beef market”

Paddy Ashdown, leader of the Liberal Democrats, responding in the House of Commons on the same day, 21 May 1996

Approach: Ashdown was leader of the Liberal Democrats, replying to Major in the Commons on the same day.

The source is useful because he offers an immediate alternative interpretation, arguing that non-cooperation was driven partly by pressure from Conservative Eurosceptics rather than simply by the beef dispute.

As an opposition leader, Ashdown had an obvious reason to criticise Major, but the source is valuable when paired with Major’s because it shows the political argument surrounding the policy at the time.

Britain's position in Europe by 1997

  • Britain remained committed to EU membership, the single market and a larger Union

  • At the same time, successive governments resisted further transfers of power to European institutions

    • Thatcher challenged the idea of a federal Europe

    • Major secured opt-outs, defended subsidiarity and opposed some further centralisation

    • In 1991, Major said he wanted Britain to be "at the very heart of Europe", but his later 'wait and see' policy on the single currency satisfied neither pro-Europeans nor Eurosceptics

  • Britain's European policy was therefore not simply pro-European or anti-European

    • The main disagreement concerned how much power the EU should have and where decisions should be made

Examiner Tips and Tricks

For the paired 1996 sources, focus on the disagreement. Major presents non-cooperation as a defence of British interests; Ashdown presents it as a response to Conservative Eurosceptic pressure. Use the wider context of the beef ban and Conservative divisions to test which explanation is better supported.

Interventions in the Balkans

The break-up of Yugoslavia

  • The collapse of communism destabilised Yugoslavia, where political and ethnic divisions became increasingly difficult to contain

    • Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević moved away from communism towards an increasingly aggressive Serbian nationalism

    • Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 1991, leading to fighting involving Serbia and Croatia

    • Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in 1992, with war beginning there in April

  • The conflict in Bosnia involved competing ethnic and territorial claims

    • Bosnian Serb forces, backed by Serbia, carried out ethnic cleansing against the Bosnian Muslim population

    • Around two million people had been driven from their homes by late 1992

      • Television images of detention camps and shelled towns increased pressure on European governments to respond

Why Britain initially avoided military intervention

  • Britain initially favoured peacekeeping and diplomacy rather than large-scale military intervention

    • The conflict was viewed as a complicated civil war involving several armed groups rather than a straightforward invasion by one state

    • Ministers were concerned that outside military forces could become trapped in a conflict without a clear solution

  • Britain therefore worked through international organisations

    • British troops joined the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from late 1992

      • The initial British contingent was around 2,400 personnel, based at Vitez in central Bosnia

      • Their role was mainly humanitarian, including escorting aid convoys and negotiating safe passage

      • They were not deployed primarily to defeat one side militarily

  • Britain also supported diplomatic attempts to end the conflict

    • Major hosted a joint European Community and UN conference in London in August 1992

    • The Vance-Owen Plan, developed by Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Secretary Lord Owen, proposed dividing Bosnia into ten provinces

      • It was never implemented because the Bosnian Serbs rejected it, and the United States would not support it

“There is no single aggressor and no single front line. In Bosnia we are dealing with Serb against Croat, Muslim against Serb, and Croat against Muslim, not just within one country but within districts, towns and villages, within streets and even mixed blocks of flats. A massive armed intervention might suppress the violence for a time, but it would achieve no permanent result. It could not force people to live together in peace; its withdrawal would be the signal for a resumption of the conflict”

Archie Hamilton, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, House of Commons, 16 November 1992

Approach: Hamilton was a Conservative defence minister, speaking in the House of Commons in November 1992 while the government’s limited military role in Bosnia was being criticised.

The source is useful because it explains the government’s argument for restraint. Hamilton presents the conflict as too complex for a simple military solution and warns that intervention might suppress violence without creating a lasting peace.

However, he was defending government policy, so he had a clear reason to justify continued peacekeeping rather than stronger military action.

“We must accept that blame because we have stood by, as a nation, and watched nothing less than the extinction of another nation and its cultural identity, the nation of Bosnia. ... A lot of the blame must rest with the Foreign Office, which has continued to portray this conflict as a civil war and promoted the myth that all sides are equally to blame. ... There have been atrocities committed on all sides, but the systematic atrocities carried out by the Serbians must be recognised.”

Kate Hoey, Labour MP for Vauxhall, House of Commons, 16 November 1992

Approach: Hoey was a Labour backbencher, speaking in the same Commons debate in November 1992.

The source is useful because she challenges the government’s claim that responsibility was evenly shared. She argues that Serbian forces were carrying out systematic atrocities and that Britain had failed to respond strongly enough.

As a backbencher criticising government policy, Hoey had more freedom to attack the official line, but her argument should still be tested against the wider complexity of the conflict.

The limits of UN peacekeeping

  • Britain's peacekeeping role reduced some immediate suffering but could not bring the war to an end

    • UN forces could protect aid deliveries and some designated areas

    • However, their restricted mandate limited their ability to stop attacks by armed forces

  • International diplomatic pressure also produced limited results

    • The UN imposed sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro in May 1992

    • A no-fly zone was declared over Bosnia in October 1992, although it was not initially enforced

  • Fighting continued until late 1995, while Sarajevo remained under siege

    • This increasingly exposed the limits of European diplomacy and UN peacekeeping

Why Britain's approach changed in 1995

  • The Srebrenica Massacre in July 1995 became a major turning point

    • Bosnian Serb forces overran a UN-declared safe area

    • More than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were killed

    • The town had been protected by a small Dutch UN peacekeeping force that was unable to stop the attack

  • Srebrenica demonstrated the limits of a purely humanitarian peacekeeping role

    • UN forces could not guarantee the safety of areas they had formally declared protected

    • Pressure increased in Britain and the United States for a stronger military response

  • NATO therefore moved from peacekeeping towards military force

    • In August and September 1995, NATO launched sustained airstrikes against Bosnian Serb positions

    • Britain took part as a leading NATO member

    • The air campaign, combined with Croat and Bosnian ground advances, helped force the Bosnian Serbs into negotiations

The Dayton Agreement, 1995

  • The Dayton Agreement was reached in November 1995 and formally signed in Paris on the 14th December 1995, with John Major among the Western leaders who witnessed it

    • Bosnia remained a single state but was divided into two political entities: a Bosniak–Croat federation and a Bosnian Serb republic (Republika Srpska)

    • A NATO-led force was deployed to enforce the settlement

      • Britain contributed troops to this force

  • The settlement showed the greater effectiveness of combining diplomacy with credible military pressure

    • Earlier European and UN negotiations had failed to stop the conflict

    • NATO intervention in 1995 helped create the conditions in which a negotiated settlement could be reached

Examiner Tips and Tricks

The strongest way to use Bosnia is to explain why British policy changed. Britain did not simply switch from “doing nothing” to intervention. It moved from humanitarian peacekeeping and diplomacy towards military force when those earlier methods proved unable to stop the violence.

Britain and the end of the Cold War

Thatcher, Reagan and Gorbachev

  • Thatcher had taken a hard line against the Soviet Union in the early 1980s and worked closely with US President Ronald Reagan

    • However, she quickly recognised that Mikhail Gorbachev was different from earlier Soviet leaders

    • She encouraged Reagan to negotiate with him

  • Britain's role was mainly that of an intermediary, or go-between, linking Washington and Moscow

    • Thatcher helped convince the United States that Gorbachev was someone it could deal with

    • The major arms-control negotiations themselves were conducted primarily between Washington and Moscow

  • Relations between the superpowers improved rapidly after 1987

    • The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed in December 1987

      • It removed an entire class of nuclear missiles from Europe

    • Soviet forces completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989

The collapse of communism, 1989–1991

Collapse of Berlin Wall
Sue Ream, CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons
  • Communist governments across Eastern Europe collapsed during 1989

    • The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989

    • Gorbachev did not use Soviet force to prevent political change in Eastern Europe

  • Thatcher welcomed the collapse of communist influence but had serious concerns about German reunification

    • She feared that a single, larger Germany could dominate Europe

    • However, Britain was unable to prevent reunification

      • The United States and West Germany supported it

      • Gorbachev did not block it

    • This showed that while Britain could influence discussion, it could not determine the outcome without the support of the major powers

  • The Soviet Union formally dissolved in December 1991

    • Britain supported bringing the former communist states of Eastern Europe into Western political and economic institutions

The Gulf War, 1991

  • The end of the Cold War also changed the way international crises were handled

    • Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990

    • The UN Security Council authorised military force to reverse the invasion

      • Soviet cooperation with the United States at the UN would have been much harder during the earlier Cold War

  • Britain played a major military role in the coalition

    • It was the largest European contributor, sending around 45,000 troops

    • Kuwait was liberated in February 1991 after a short ground campaign

  • The war showed that Britain could still act as an important military ally of the United States

    • However, Saddam Hussein remained in power

    • The conflict therefore did not produce a complete settlement of the wider problem

"America's highest civilian award is the Medal of Freedom. And we are here to present it to one of the greatest leaders of our time. ... Mrs. Thatcher understood the ties that bind our nations, moral and economic, political and spiritual. ... No country could have had a more valiant comrade in arms. We will never forget her courage in helping forge a great coalition against the aggression which brutalized the Gulf. ... Margaret Thatcher helped bring the cold war to an end"

President George H. W. Bush, remarks on presenting the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Margaret Thatcher, the White House, 7 March 1991

Approach: Bush made these remarks in 1991 while presenting Thatcher with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, shortly after she had left office.

The source is useful because it shows how the United States publicly presented Thatcher’s contribution to the end of the Cold War and the Anglo-American alliance.

However, this was a ceremonial tribute, so Bush had a clear reason to praise Thatcher. His claim that she helped “bring the Cold War to an end” should therefore be compared with the much larger role played by Gorbachev, Reagan and developments inside the Soviet bloc.

Britain's influence at the end of the Cold War

  • Britain remained an important diplomatic and military ally of the United States

    • Thatcher helped shape American attitudes towards Gorbachev

    • Britain also played a major role in the Gulf War

  • However, Britain was not the main power determining the end of the Cold War

    • Arms control was negotiated primarily by the United States and Soviet Union

    • Britain could not stop German reunification

  • Britain's influence therefore depended heavily on its relationship with the United States

    • It could help shape Western policy

    • It had much less power to decide the final outcome on its own

Examiner Tips and Tricks

Do not give Thatcher too much credit for ending the Cold War. A stronger argument is that Britain had influence through its relationship with the United States, particularly in helping Reagan take Gorbachev seriously, but the decisive decisions were made in Washington and Moscow.

How far did Britain's world role shift, 1987–1997?

  • This key question weighs change in Britain's international role against the survival of its main alliances, institutions and military capabilities

Evidence that Britain's role shifted

  • The end of the Cold War removed the framework that had shaped British foreign policy since 1945

    • The Soviet threat declined, and Britain no longer had to organise its defence primarily around East-West confrontation

    • The 1990 Options for Change review cut the armed forces by around a fifth to deliver a 'peace dividend'

  • Europe became a much more important political issue

    • Maastricht, the single currency, and the Social Chapter raised questions about how much sovereignty Britain should share

    • Britain also occupied a distinctive position inside the EU through its opt-outs

  • Britain increasingly acted through international organisations

    • The Gulf War operated under a UN mandate

    • In Bosnia, Britain first served through the UN and later took part in NATO military action

  • The Balkan Wars also revealed limits to European power

    • European diplomacy struggled to end the conflict

    • A settlement became possible only after stronger US and NATO involvement

Evidence that Britain's role remained broadly similar

  • Britain retained the main features of a major power

    • It kept a permanent seat on the UN Security Council

    • It retained an independent nuclear deterrent and a worldwide diplomatic network

  • The special relationship with the United States remained central

    • Britain was the largest European contributor to the coalition in the 1991 Gulf War

    • Anglo-American cooperation remained important in later crises

    • Britain also remained a leading member of NATO

      • British aircraft took part in the 1995 Bosnia airstrikes

      • British troops helped enforce the Dayton settlement

  • Britain stayed firmly inside the European Union

    • It supported the single market and enlargement, even while resisting deeper political integration

  • Britain continued to deploy military forces overseas

    • Its ability and willingness to intervene abroad had not disappeared with the Cold War

Examiner Tips and Tricks

Decide what you mean by “world role” before you judge how far it changed.

If you measure Britain by its capabilities, continuity is striking: nuclear weapons, NATO membership, the UN Security Council seat and overseas deployments all remained. If you measure Britain by the problems it faced and the organisations it worked through, the change is much greater.

That distinction gives you a much stronger argument than simply choosing 1989 as a turning point and saying everything changed afterwards.

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Lottie Bates

Author: Lottie Bates

Expertise: Curriculum Expert

Lottie has worked in education as a teacher of History and Classical subjects, supporting students across GCSE, IGCSE and A Level. This has given her a strong understanding of how to help students succeed in exams, particularly when structuring written answers and using specific evidence effectively. She believes that studying history helps students make sense of the modern world, and is passionate about making complex topics clear, accessible and relevant to exam success.

Bridgette Barrett

Reviewer: Bridgette Barrett

Expertise: Development Editor

After graduating with a degree in Geography, Bridgette completed a PGCE over 30 years ago. She later gained an MA Learning, Technology and Education from the University of Nottingham focussing on online learning. At a time when the study of geography has never been more important, Bridgette is passionate about creating content which supports students in achieving their potential in geography and builds their confidence.